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Abstract
We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbi-
trary strategic games based on the possibility
correspondences. Such an analysis calls for
the use of transfinite iterations of the corre-
sponding operators. Our approach is based
on Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem and applies
both to the notions of rationalizability and
the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies.
1 Introduction
Epistemic analysis of strategic games (in short, games)
aims at predicting the choices of rational players in the
presence of (partial or common) knowledge or belief of
the behaviour of other players. Most often it focusses
on the iterated elimination of never best responses (a
notion termed as rationalizability), and the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS).
Starting with Aumann [1987], Brandenburger and
Dekel [1987] and Tan and Werlang [1988] a large body
of literature arose that investigates the epistemic foun-
dations of rationalizability by modelling the reason-
ing employed by players in choosing their strategies.
Such an analysis, based either on possibility correspon-
dences and partition spaces, or Harsanyi type spaces, is
limited either to finite or compact games with continu-
ous payoffs, or to two-player games, see, e.g., Battigalli
and Bonanno [1999] or Ely and Peski [2006].
In turn, in the case of IESDS the epistemic analysis
has focussed on finite games (with an infinite hierarchy
of beliefs) and strict dominance either by pure or by
mixed strategies, see, e.g. Brandenburger, Friedenberg
and Keisler [2004].
In this paper we provide an epistemic analysis of ar-
bitrary strategic games based on the possibility corre-
spondences. More specifically, denote by RAT(φ) the
property that each player i uses a monotonic property
φi to select his strategy (‘each player i is φi-rational’).
Then the following sets of strategy profiles coincide:
• those that the players choose in the states in which
RAT(φ) is common knowledge,
• those that the players choose in the states in which
RAT(φ) is true and is common belief,
• those that remain after the iterated elimination of
the strategies that are not φi-optimal.
This requires that transfinite iterations of the strategy
elimination are allowed and covers the usual notion of
rationalizability and a ’global’ version1 of the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the
customary, ‘local’ version of the iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies (that is defined using
a non-monotonic property) we justify the statement
common knowledge of rationality implies
that the players will choose only strate-
gies that survive the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies
for arbitrary games and transfinite iterations of the
elimination process. Rationality refers here to the con-
cept studied in Bernheim [1984].
Our results complement the findings of Lipman [1991]
in which transfinite ordinals are used in a study of lim-
ited rationality and Lipman [1994], where a two-player
game is constructed for which the ω0 (the first infinite
ordinal) and ω0 + 1 iterations of the rationalizability
operator of Bernheim [1984] differ. In turn, Heifetz
and Samet [1998] show that in general arbitrary ordi-
nals are necessary in the epistemic analysis of strate-
gic games based on the partition spaces. Further, as
1The concepts of ‘global’ and ‘local’ versions are clari-
fied in Section 3.
argued in Chen, Long and Luo [2005], the notion of
IESDS a` la Milgrom and Roberts [1990], when used
for arbitrary games, also requires transfinite iterations
of the underlying operator.
The relevance of monotonicity in the context of epis-
temic analysis of finite strategic games has already
been pointed out in van Benthem [2007], where the
notions of strict dominance and rationalizability are
studied using a public announcement logic.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall basic results concerning op-
erators on a complete lattice and the relevant notions
concerning strategic games.
2.1 Operators
Consider a fixed complete lattice (D, ⊆ ) with the
largest element ⊤. In what follows we use ordinals and
denote them by α, β, γ. Given a, possibly transfinite,
sequence (Gα)α<γ of elements of D we denote their
join and meet respectively by
⋃
α<γ Gα and
⋂
α<γ Gα.
Definition 1 Let T be an operator on (D, ⊆ ), i.e.,
T : D→D.
• We call T monotonic if for all G1, G2
G1 ⊆G2 implies T (G1)⊆ T (G2).
• We call T contracting if for all G
T (G)⊆G.
• We say that an element G is a fixpoint of T if
G = T (G) and a post-fixpoint of T if G⊆ T (G).
• We define by transfinite induction a sequence of
elements Tα of D, where α is an ordinal, as fol-
lows:
– T 0 := ⊤,
– Tα+1 := T (Tα),
– for all limit ordinals β, T β :=
⋂
α<β T
α.
• We call the least α such that Tα+1 = Tα the
closure ordinal of T and denote it by αT . We
call then TαT the outcome of (iterating) T and
write it alternatively as T∞. ✷
So an outcome is a fixpoint reached by a transfinite
iteration that starts with the largest element. In gen-
eral, the outcome of an operator does not need to
exist but we have the following classic result due to
Tarski [1955].2
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem Every monotonic oper-
ator T on (D, ⊆ ) has an outcome, i.e., T∞ is well-
defined. Moreover,
T∞ = νT = ∪{G | G⊆ T (G)},
where νT is the largest fixpoint of T .
In contrast, a contracting operator does not need to
have a largest fixpoint. But we have the following
obvious observation.
Note 1 Every contracting operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has
an outcome, i.e., T∞ is well-defined.
In Section 5 we shall need the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider two operators T1 and T2 on
(D, ⊆ ) such that
• for all G, T1(G)⊆ T2(G),
• T1 is monotonic,
• T2 is contracting.
Then T∞1 ⊆ T
∞
2 .
Proof.We first prove by transfinite induction that for
all α
Tα1 ⊆ T
α
2 . (1)
By the definition of the iterations we only need to con-
sider the induction step for a successor ordinal. So
suppose the claim holds for some α. Then by the first
two assumptions and the induction hypothesis we have
the following string of inclusions and equalities:
Tα+11 = T1(T
α
1 )⊆ T1(T
α
2 )⊆ T2(T
α
2 ) = T
α+1
2 .
This shows that for all α (1) holds. By Tarski’s Fix-
point Theorem and Note 1 the outcomes of T1 and T2
exist, which implies the claim. ✷
2.2 Strategic games
Given n players (n > 1) by a strategic
game (in short, a game) we mean a sequence
(S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn), where for each i ∈ [1..n]
• Si is the non-empty set of strategies (sometimes
called actions) available to player i,
2We use here its ‘dual’ version in which the iterations
start at the largest and not at the least element of a com-
plete lattice.
• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so
pi : S1 × . . .× Sn→R, where R is the set of real
numbers.
We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly
with some superscripts. Given s ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn we
denote the ith element of s by si, write sometimes s
as (si, s−i), and use the following standard notation:
• s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
• S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn.
Given a finite non-empty set A we denote by ∆A the
set of probability distributions over A and call any
element of ∆Si a mixed strategy of player i.
In what follows we assume an initial strategic game
H := (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn).
A restriction of H is a sequence (S1, . . ., Sn) such
that Si ⊆ Ti for i ∈ [1..n]. We identify the restriction
(T1, . . ., Tn) with H . We shall focus on the complete
lattice that consists of the set of all restrictions of the
game H ordered by the componentwise set inclusion:
(S1, . . ., Sn)⊆ (S
′
1, . . ., S
′
n) iff Si ⊆ S
′
i for all i ∈ [1..n].
So H is the largest element in this lattice and
⋃
α<γ
and
⋂
α<γ are the customary set-theoretic operations
on the restrictions.
Consider now a restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H and
two strategies si, s
′
i from Ti (so not necessarily from
Si). We say that si is strictly dominated on G by
s′i if
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i),
and write then s′i ≻G si.
In the case of finite games, once the payoff function
is extended in the expected way to mixed strategies,
the relation ≻G between a mixed strategy and a pure
strategy is defined in the same way.
Further, given a restriction G′ := (S′1, . . ., S
′
n) of H ,
we say that the strategy si from Ti is a best response
in G′ to some belief µi held in G if
∀s′i ∈ S
′
i pi(si, µi) ≥ pi(s
′
i, µi).
A belief held in G := (S1, . . ., Sn) can be
• a joint strategy of the opponents of player i in G
(i.e., s−i ∈ S−i),
• or, in the case the game is finite, a joint
mixed strategy of the opponents of player i (i.e.,
(m1, . . .,mi−1,mi+1, . . .,mn), where mj ∈ ∆Sj
for all j),
• or a correlated strategy of the opponents of
player i (i.e., m ∈ ∆S−i).
Every joint mixed strategy of the opponents of player
i can be identified with their correlated strategy.
3 Set up
The assumption that each player is rational is one of
the basic stipulations within the framework of strate-
gic games. However, rationality can be differently in-
terpreted by different players.3 This may for example
mean that a player
• does not choose a strategy strictly dominated by
another pure/mixed strategy,
• chooses only best replies to the (beliefs about the)
strategies of the opponents.
In this paper we are interested in analyzing situations
in which each player pursues his own notion of ratio-
nality, more specifically the situations in which this
information is common knowledge or common belief.
As a special case we cover then the usually analyzed
situation in which all players use the same notion of
rationality.
Given player i in a strategic game H :=
(T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) we formalize his notion of ratio-
nality as a property φi(si, G,G
′) that holds between
a state si ∈ Ti and restrictions G and G′ of H . Intu-
itively, φ(si, G,G
′) holds if si is an ‘optimal’ strategy
for player i within the restriction G in the context of
G′, assuming that he uses the property φ to select op-
timal strategies.
Here are some examples of the property φ which show
that the abovementioned rationality notions can be
formalized in a number of natural ways:
• sd(si, G,G′) that holds iff the strategy si of player
i is not strictly dominated on G by any strategy
from the restriction G′ := (S′1, . . ., S
′
n) of H (i.e.,
¬∃s′i ∈ S
′
i s
′
i ≻G si),
• (assuming H is finite) msd(si, G,G′) that holds
iff the strategy si of player i is not strictly dom-
inated on G by any of its mixed strategy from
the restriction G′ := (S′1, . . ., S
′
n) of H , (i.e.,
¬∃m′i ∈ ∆S
′
i m
′
i ≻G si),
3This matter is obfuscated by the fact that the ety-
mologically related noun ‘rationalizability’ stands by now
for the concept introduced in Bernheim [1984] and Pearce
[1984] that refers to the outcome of iterated elimination of
never best responses.
• br(si, G,G′) that holds iff the strategy si of player
i is a best response in the restriction G′ :=
(S′1, . . ., S
′
n) of H to some belief µi held in G (i.e.,
for some belief µi held in G, ∀s′i ∈ S
′
i pi(si, µi) ≥
pi(s
′
i, µi)).
Two natural possibilities for G′ are G′ = H or G′ =
G. We then abbreviate φ(si, G,H) to φ
g(si, G) and
φ(si, G,G) to φ
l(si, G) and henceforth focus on the
binary properties φ(·, ·). (The superscript ‘g’ stands
for ’global’ and ‘l’ for ’local’.)
We say that the property φ(·, ·) (used by player i) is
monotonic if for all restrictions G and G′ of H and
si ∈ Ti
G⊆G′ and φ(si, G) implies φ(si, G′).
Each sequence of properties φ := (φ1, . . ., φn) deter-
mines an operator Tφ on the restrictions of H defined
by
Tφ(G) := (S
′
1, . . ., S
′
n),
where G := (S1, . . ., Sn) and for all i ∈ [1..n]
S′i := {si ∈ Si | φi(si, G)}.
Since Tφ is contracting, by Note 1 it has an outcome,
i.e., T∞
φ
is well-defined. Moreover, if each φi is mono-
tonic, then Tφ is monotonic and by Tarski’s Fixpoint
Theorem its largest fixpoint νTφ exists and equals T
∞
φ
.
Intuitively, Tφ(G) is the result of removing from G all
strategies that are not φi-optimal. So the outcome of
Tφ is the result of the iterated elimination of strategies
that for player i are not φi-optimal, where i ∈ [1..n].
When each property φi equals φ, we write Tφ instead of
Tφ. The natural examples of such an iterated elimina-
tion of strategies that were discussed in the literature
are:4
• iterated elimination of strategies that are strictly
dominated by another strategy;
This corresponds to the iterations of the Tsd l
operator in the case of Dufwenberg and Stege-
man [2002]) and of the Tsd g operator in the case
of Chen, Long and Luo [2005].
• (for finite games) iterated elimination of strategies
that are strictly dominated by a mixed strategy;
This is the customary situation studied starting
with Luce and Raiffa [1957] that corresponds to
the iterations of the Tmsd l operator.
4The reader puzzled by the existence of multiple defi-
nitions for the apparently uniquely defined concepts is en-
couraged to consult Apt [2007].
• iterated elimination of strategies that are never
best responses to some belief;
This corresponds to the iterations of the Tbr g op-
erator in the case of Bernheim [1984] and the Tbr l
operator in the case of Pearce [1984], in each case
for an appropriate set of beliefs.
Usually only the first ωo iterations of the correspond-
ing operator T are considered, i.e., one studies Tω0,
that is
⋂
i<ω0
T i, and not T∞.
In the next section we assume that each player i em-
ploys some property φi to select his strategies and ana-
lyze the situation in which this information is common
knowledge. To determine which strategies are then se-
lected by the players we shall use the Tφ operator. We
shall also explain why in general transfinite iterations
are necessary.
4 Two theorems
To proceed further we need to recall some basic facts
concerning the epistemic analysis of strategic games.
The approach taken below is based on the partition
spaces, or more generally possibility correspondences.
We follow here the exposition of Battigalli and Bo-
nanno [1999].
Given the initial game H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) we
assume a space Ω of states such that in each state
ω ∈ Ω each player i chooses the strategy si(ω) ∈ Ti.
We assume that for i ∈ [1..n] we have |Ω| ≥ |Ti|, where
for a set A we denote its cardinality by |A|. A natural
example of Ω satisfying this assumption is the set of
joint strategies in the game H . Then given a state
ω := s we simply have si(ω) = si.
A possibility correspondence is a mapping from Ω
to P(Ω). We consider three properties of a possibility
correspondence P :
(i) for all ω, P (ω) 6= ∅,
(ii) for all ω and ω′, ω′ ∈ P (ω) implies P (ω′) = P (ω),
(iii) for all ω, ω ∈ P (ω).
If the possibility correspondence satisfies properties (i)
and (ii), we call it a belief correspondence and if it
satisfies properties (i)–(iii), we call it a knowledge
correspondence.5
In the latter case the correspondence P yields a parti-
tion {P (ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of Ω.
5In the modal logic terminology a belief correspondence
is a frame for the modal logic KD45 and a knowledge cor-
respondence is a frame for the modal logic S5, see, e.g.
Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema [2001].
We assume that each player i has a possibility corre-
spondence Pi on Ω. Recall that an event is a subset
of Ω, and that an event F is evident if for all ω ∈ F
we have Pi(ω)⊆ F for all i ∈ [1..n].
Following Aumann [1976] if each Pi is a knowledge
correspondence, we say that an event E is a common
knowledge in the state ω ∈ Ω if for some evident
event F we have ω ∈ F ⊆ E. We write then ω ∈ K∗E.
Finally, (using a characterization of Monderer and
Samet [1989]) if each Pi is a belief correspondence,
we say that an event E is a common belief in the
state ω ∈ Ω if for some evident event F we have ω ∈
F ⊆BE, where BE = {ω ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ [1..n]Pi(ω)⊆ E}.
We write then ω ∈ B∗E.
Each event E determines a restrictionGE ofH defined
by GE := (S1, . . ., Sn), where for all j ∈ [1..n]
Sj := {sj(ω
′) | ω′ ∈ E}.
In particular, when player i knows (respectively, be-
lieves) that the state is in Pi(ω), the restriction
GPi(ω) represents his knowledge (respectively, his be-
lief) about the players’ strategies.
Given now a property φi(·, G) that player i uses to
select his strategies in the restriction G of H , we
say that player i is φi-rational in the state ω if
φi(si(ω), GPi(ω)) holds. Intuitively, if the state of the
world is ω, player i only knows (respectively, believes)
that the state of the world is in Pi(ω). So GPi(ω) is
the game he knows (respectively, believes in). Hence
φi(si(ω), GPi(ω)) captures the idea that if player i uses
φi(·, ·) to select his optimal strategy in the game he is
‘aware of’, then in the state ω he indeed acts ’ratio-
nally’.
We are interested in the strategies selected by each
player in the states in which it is common knowledge
(or true and common belief) that each player i is φi-
rational. To this end we introduce the following set of
states6:
RAT(φ) := {ω ∈ Ω | each player i is φi-rational in ω}
and focus on the following two sets of states:
CK(φ) := {ω ∈ Ω | for some knowledge
correspondences P1, . . ., Pn
ω ∈ K∗RAT(φ)},
CB(φ) := {ω ∈ Ω | for some belief
correspondences P1, . . ., Pn
ω ∈ RAT(φ) and ω ∈ B∗RAT(φ)}
6
RAT(φ) is always used in the context of specific pos-
sibility correspondences.
and the corresponding restrictionsGCK(φ) and GCB(φ)
of H .
The following result then characterizes for arbitrary
strategic games the restrictions GCK(φ) and GCB(φ)
in terms of the operator Tφ.
Theorem 1 Suppose that each property φi is mono-
tonic. Then
GCK(φ) = GCB(φ) = T
∞
φ
.
Proof. We prove three inclusions.
(i) GCK(φ) ⊆GCB(φ).
This inclusion (for an arbitrary φ) is an immediate
consequence of the following alternative characteriza-
tion of common knowledge due to Monderer and Samet
[1989]: if each Pi is a knowledge correspondence, an
event E is a common knowledge in the state ω ∈ Ω if
for some evident event F we have ω ∈ F ⊆KE, where
KE = {ω ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ [1..n] Pi(ω)⊆ E}.
(ii) GCB(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
.
Take a strategy si that is an element of the ith com-
ponent of GCB(φ). So si = si(ω) for some ω ∈ CB(φ).
Then ω ∈ RAT(φ) and ω ∈ B∗RAT(φ). The latter
implies that for some evident event F
ω ∈ F ⊆ {ω′ ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ [1..n] Pi(ω
′)⊆RAT(φ)}. (2)
Take now an arbitrary ω′ ∈ F ∩RAT(φ) and i ∈ [1..n].
Since ω′ ∈ RAT(φ), player i is φi-rational in ω′,
i.e., φi(si(ω
′), GPi(ω′)) holds. But F is evident, so
Pi(ω
′)⊆ F . Moreover by (2) Pi(ω′)⊆RAT(φ), so
Pi(ω
′)⊆ F ∩ RAT(φ). Hence GPi(ω′) ⊆GF∩RAT(φ)
and by the monotonicity of φi we conclude that
φi(si(ω
′), GF∩RAT(φ)) holds.
By the definition of Tφ this means that
GF∩RAT(φ) ⊆ Tφ(GRAT(φ)), i.e. that GF∩RAT(φ)
is a post-fixpoint of Tφ. Hence by Tarski’s Fixpoint
Theorem GF∩RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
.
But si = si(ω) and ω ∈ F ∩RAT(φ), so we conclude
by the above inclusion that si is an element of the ith
component of T∞
φ
. This proves GCB(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
.
(iii) T∞
φ
⊆GCK(φ).
Recall that H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn). We first de-
fine
• the functions s1 : Ω→ T1, . . ., sn : Ω→ Tn,
• an event E,
• the knowledge correspondences P1, . . ., Pn.
Suppose T∞
φ
= (S1, . . ., Sn). Choose j ∈ [1..n] such
that the set Sj0 has the largest cardinality among the
sets S1, . . ., Sn. Define the function sj0 : Ω→ Tj0 arbi-
trarily, but so that it is onto (note that this is possible
since by assumption |Ω| ≥ |Tj0 |) and let E := s
−1
j0
(Sj0 ).
Our aim is to ensure that
GE = T
∞
φ
.
So we define each function sk : Ω→ Tk, where k 6= j0,
in such a way that s−1k (Sk) = E. Note that this is
possible since |E| ≥ |Sj0 | ≥ |Sk|.
Next, we define each knowledge correspondence Pi ar-
bitrarily but so that for all ω ∈ E we have Pi(ω) = E.
Then for all i ∈ [1..n]
GPi(ω) = GE .
We now show that for all ω ∈ E each player i is
φi-rational in ω. So take an arbitrary ω ∈ E and
i ∈ [1..n]. By the definition of the function si(·) a
strategy si ∈ Si exists such that si = si(ω). Now,
T∞
φ
is a fixpoint of Tφ, so φi(si, T
∞
φ
) holds. But
T∞
φ
= GE = GPi(ω), so φi(si(ω), GPi(ω)) holds, i.e.
player i is indeed φi-rational in ω.
To complete the proof take now an arbitrary strategy
si ∈ Si. By the definition of the function si(·) a state
ω ∈ E exists such that si = si(ω). Further, we just
showed that each player j is φj -rational in ω. But by
the definition of the knowledge correspondences E is
an evident event, so it is common knowledge in ω that
each player j is φj -rational in ω. Hence ω ∈ CK(φ)
and consequently si is an element of the ith component
of GCK(φ).
This proves that T∞
φ
⊆GCK(φ). ✷
This theorem shows that when each property φi
is monotonic, the strategy profiles that the players
choose in the states in which it is common knowl-
edge that each player i is φi-rational (or in which each
player i is φi-rational and it is common belief that
each player i is φi-rational), are exactly those that re-
main after the iterated elimination of the strategies
that are not φi-optimal. It generalizes corresponding
results established for finite strategic games (for their
survey see Battigalli and Bonanno [1999]) to the case
of arbitrary strategic games and arbitrary monotonic
properties φi.
In Chen, Long and Luo [2005], Lipman [1994] and
Apt [2007] examples are provided showing that for the
properties of strict dominance (namely sd g) and best
response (namely br g) in general transfinite iterations
(i.e., iterations beyond ω0) of the corresponding oper-
ator are necessary to reach the outcome. So to achieve
equalities in the above theorem transfinite iterations
of the Tφ operator are necessary.
By instantiating φis to specific properties we get in-
stances of the above result that relate to specific def-
initions of rationality. Before we do this we establish
another result that will apply to another class of prop-
erties φi.
Consider the following natural property of the under-
lying functions si(·)s:
A For each strategy si from H a state ω ∈ Ω exists
such that si = si(ω).
Theorem 2 Suppose that property A holds and
φi(si, ({s1}, . . ., {sn})) for all i ∈ [1..n] and si ∈ Ti.
(3)
Then
GCK(φ) = GCB(φ) = H.
Proof. As noted in the proof of Theorem 1, for all φ
we have GCK(φ) ⊆GCB(φ). So it suffices to prove that
H ⊆GCK(φ).
So take a strategy si of player i in H . By property
A a state ω exists such that si = si(ω). Choose for
each player j a knowledge correspondence Pj such that
Pj(ω) = {ω}. Then
GPj(ω) = ({s1(ω)}, . . ., {sn(ω)})
and, on the account of (3), each player j is φj -rational
in ω.
By the choice of the knowledge correspondences {ω} is
an evident event. Hence it is common knowledge in ω
that each player j is φj-rational in ω. So by definition
si is an element of the ith component of CKφ. ✷
Note that any property φi that satisfies (3) and is not
trivial (that is, for some strategy si, φi(si, H) does not
hold) is not monotonic.
5 . . . and their consequences
Let us analyze now the consequences of the above two
theorems. Consider first Theorem 1. The following
lemma, in which we refer to the properties introduced
in Section 3, clarifies the matters.
Lemma 2 The properties sd g, msd g and br g are
monotonic.
Proof. Straightforward. ✷
So Theorem 1 applies to the above three properties.
(Note that br g actually comes in three ’flavours’ de-
pending on the choice of beliefs.) Strict dominance
in the sense of sd g is studied in Chen, Long and
Luo [2005], while br g corresponds to the rationaliz-
ability notion of Bernheim [1984].
To see the consequences of Theorem 2 note the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 3 The properties sd l, msd l and br l satisfy
(3).
Proof. Straightforward. ✷
So Theorem 2 shows that the ‘customary’ concepts of
strict dominance, sd l and msd l and the ’local’ version
of the best response property br l cannot be justified
in the used epistemic framework as ‘stand alone’ con-
cepts of rationality. Indeed, this theorem shows that
common knowledge that each player is rational in one
of these three senses does not exclude any strategy.
What can be done is to justify these concepts as con-
sequences of the common knowledge of rationality de-
fined in terms of br g, the ‘global’ version of the best
response property, Namely, we have the following re-
sult. When each property φi equals φ, we write here
CK(φ) instead of CK(φ) and analogously for CB.
Theorem 3 For all games H
GCK(br g) = GCB(br g) ⊆ T
∞
sd l
,
where we take as the set of beliefs the set of joint strate-
gies of the opponents.
Proof. By Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 GCK(br g) =
GCB(br g) = T
∞
br g
. Each best response to a joint strat-
egy of the opponents is not strictly dominated, so for
all restrictions G
Tbr g (G)⊆ Tsd g (G)
and also
Tsd g (G) ⊆ Tsd l(G).
So by Lemma 1 T∞
br g
⊆ T∞
sd l
, which concludes the
proof. ✷
The above result formalizes and justifies in the epis-
temic framework used here the often used statement:
common knowledge of rationality implies
that the players will choose only strate-
gies that survive the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies
for games with arbitrary strategy sets and transfinite
iterations of the elimination process.
In the case of finite games we have the following known
result. For a proof using Harsanyi type spaces see
Brandenburger and Friedenberg [2006].
Theorem 4 For all finite games H
GCK(br g) = GCB(br g) ⊆ T
∞
msd l
,
where we take as the set of beliefs the set of joint mixed
strategies of the opponents.
Proof. The argument is analogous as in the previous
proof but relies on a subsidiary result.
Again by Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 GCK(br g) =
GCB(br g) = T
∞
br g
. Further, for all restrictions G
Tbr g (G)⊆ Tbr l(G)
and
Tbr l(G)⊆ Tbrc l(G),
where brc l stands for the best response property
w.r.t. the correlated strategies of the opponents. So
by Lemma 1 T∞
br g
⊆ T∞
brc l
.
But by the result of Osborne and Rubinstein [1994,
page 60] (that is a modification of the original re-
sult of Pearce [1984]) for all restrictions G we have
Tbrc l(G) = Tmsd l(G), so T
∞
brc l
= T∞
msd l
, which yields
the conclusion. ✷
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